Regime change in Moscow could immediately end Ukraine war

There is nothing simple about the Russia-Ukraine war. Despite boasting of taking Kyiv in three days, Russia has been entrenched in a war since February 2022. And, despite Donald Trump’s boasts, only 25 per cent of aid to Ukraine reaches the country; 60 per cent stays in the US

 UKRAINE-CRISIS/CONTRACT Action stations: Young Ukrainian soldiers attend oath-taking ceremony at an undisclosed location | Reuters
Mridula Ghosh Mridula Ghosh

Diary of Resilience/ Mridula Ghosh/ Kyiv

To save face from many lost battles against Ukraine, and to get what it needs from the international community, Russia needs a regime change. However, the imperialist circles led by President Putin are still quite dominant, and they have rallied a large number of people to their side. Therefore, many are sceptical whether Russia would honour any ceasefire.

Ask anyone in Ukraine how to stop the war, and they will say: let Putin order his soldiers to leave Ukraine’s sovereign territory, and there will be no war. However, this straightforward solution finds no echo in the imperialist realm of warmongering Russia.

Why Russia needs peace

With the occupation of Crimea in February 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia etched its name in history as an aggressor, violating the UN Charter, the Budapest Memorandum (security assurances granted to Ukraine for joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) and every conceivable international treaty. After 80 years, Russia unleashed a brutal war on mainland Europe, just as Germany and the Soviet Union did in 1939 when they attacked Poland, launching World War II.

By claiming NATO and Europe are subsidised by the US, Trump has upended long-held views of Euro-Atlantic cooperation and diplomacy. He has also advanced unprecedented economic demands, waging tariff wars on other countries.
Historically, the US has supported Russia at Ukraine’s expense―recognising the USSR (1932) amid the Ukrainian famine, forcing Ukraine to abandon its nuclear arsenal under the Budapest Memorandum (1994) and failing its obligations when Russia took Crimea in 2014.

Despite boasting that it would seize Kyiv in three days and subdue Ukraine in two weeks, Russia, the self-proclaimed second most powerful army in the world, has lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers and yet failed to secure victory. Equally humiliating is its reliance on North Korean troops and its decision to bring people from South Asian and African nations under false contracts to fight on the frontlines.

Russia’s economy worsens daily under sanctions, though it deploys various tactics to evade them. Elite economic and political circles in Russia realise the war’s futility, yearning for peace and lifting of sanctions. Yet, the leadership persists with nuclear sabre-rattling and reiterates outdated, unreasonable demands on sovereign Ukraine.

Peace for Ukraine is existential

A smaller power than Russia, Ukraine entered the conflict with its defence capabilities at a nadir following the Budapest Memorandum, when it relinquished its nuclear arsenal. Over the years, Ukrainian policymakers did little to bolster its defences for such a war. Who could have foreseen a conflict with Russia?

Once the world’s third-largest nuclear power, Ukraine now appeals to some 30 nations for arms to defend itself. A series of meetings, conferences and negotiations has unfolded. President Volodymyr Zelensky presented a 10-point plan at the Bali G20 Summit in 2022, followed by summits in Copenhagen, Jeddah, and Bern―all to no avail. Ukrainians have mounted a tenacious resistance, but delayed and inadequate arms supplies have halted planned offensives, forcing tactical shifts.

UKRAINE-CRISIS/ZELENSKIY Zelensky | Reuters

Ukraine has pushed into Russia’s Kursk region, currently holding parts of it, while Russia occupies 20 per cent of Ukraine’s territory, conducting deportations and population replacements there. It has even enshrined these territories in its constitution as its own, flagrantly violating Ukraine’s sovereignty. Putin also is indicted by the International Criminal Court for the suspected kidnapping of 19,000 Ukrainian children. Thus, beyond peace, Ukraine must reclaim its land and its people. It does not need to haggle for a truce―it requires a lasting, just resolution.

Many perceive a Trump-Putin alliance because of the similarities in their statements with regard to Zelensky (in pic) , that he has no legitimacy without elections. Trump’s claim that Zelensky’s ratings had sunk to 4 per cent was swiftly debunked by polls showing 65–67 per cent support.

Trump’s hyperbole and the reality of US aid

As the war of attrition prompts both sides to explore peace, the shift in US leadership has marked a turning point, presenting opportunities and challenges alike. The spotlight is now on US President Donald Trump.

By claiming NATO and Europe are subsidised by the US, Trump has upended long-held views of Euro-Atlantic cooperation and diplomacy. He has also advanced unprecedented economic demands, waging tariff wars on other countries―including neighbours Canada and Mexico―and even staking territorial claims on Greenland, perhaps hinting at Arctic ambitions.

Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA) rhetoric, his choice to appoint the unelected Elon Musk as head of the department of government efficiency (DOGE), his efforts to dismiss federal staff, his cancellation of university and research funding and his curbs on Voice of America’s free speech services have drawn widespread criticism, though they have won praise from some Russians.

Trump’s exaggerated claims of millions killed and hundreds of cities reduced to rubble were overblown, as was his repeated assertion that US aid to Ukraine totalled $350 billion. Official US records tell a different tale. Since February 2022, Congress has passed five major bills totalling $175 billion. Additionally, in December 2024, a $20 billion loan was approved, to be repaid with interest from frozen Russian assets. (Of this, about $128 billion has directly supported Ukraine’s government.) Zelensky clarified these figures at a news conference on February 23.

The Ukrainian government has received most, but not all, of this funding. A significant portion was spent in the US, paying American factories and workers to produce weapons either sent to Ukraine or used to restock Pentagon reserves depleted during the war. An analysis by the American Enterprise Institute found that Ukraine aid supports defence manufacturing in over 70 American cities.

Confusion emerged when Zelensky noted on February 2 that Ukraine had received only $75 billion of the $175 billion allocated by the US. What became of the other $100 billion? Was it lost or stolen? No. The explanation is that only a portion passes through Ukrainian hands. A large part pays for activities related to the war, but not to Ukraine directly. These include the training of Ukrainian forces, global humanitarian assistance, additional costs of US surge forces in Europe and intelligence support for both NATO and Ukraine. The Center for Strategic and International Studies notes that “aid to Ukraine” is a misnomer: 60 per cent stays in the US, 25 per cent reaches Ukraine, and 15 per cent is spent globally. Moreover, Trump’s claim that the US outspends Europe on Ukraine is false, as data shows Europe’s contributions exceed those of the US.

Trump-Putin” tandem or stand-off?

Many perceive a Trump-Putin alliance because of the similarities in their statements with regard to Zelensky, that he has no legitimacy without elections. Trump’s claim that Zelensky’s ratings had sunk to 4 per cent was swiftly debunked by polls showing 65–67 per cent support. Beyond that, conferences and meetings on Ukraine have revealed stark differences between European and US approaches. Peace now hinges on Trump, who boasted during his campaign that he could end the war in 24 hours. Europe, however, remains sceptical of quick fixes. Against this backdrop, attention turned to the Munich Security Conference.

True, Munich 2025 was not Munich 1938 (when France and Britain agreed to German annexation of the German-majority part of Czechoslovakia), but US Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech exposed a growing rift between Europe and the US. The US began engaging Russia on Ukraine, and any talks excluding Ukraine shocked analysts and leaders in Ukraine and Europe, evoking memories of Munich 1938 and the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 (when colonial powers partitioned Africa among themselves). Talks shaping Ukraine’s fate ultimately included the country, though not without tension for Zelensky at the Oval Office. Trump’s declaration to withhold all aid and vital intelligence rattled Ukraine, yet Zelensky’s domestic support rose further. US officials secretly met and urged Ukrainian figures like former president Petro Poroshenko and former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko to push for elections, but both wanted status quo to prevail till the war ended.

These events highlighted the divergent stances of the US and Europe on Russia. A seemingly apocalyptic diplomatic impasse after the Oval Office incident was deftly averted through wise counsel to Ukraine from Jonathan Powell, Britain’s national security adviser and a close aide to Prime Minister Keir Starmer, joined by seasoned Ukrainian negotiators and allies. Diplomacy matured.

What appears as a Trump-Putin tandem, threatening Ukraine’s security, may yet become a stand-off under global scrutiny. Beyond a rare earth minerals deal with Ukraine, the pressing issue is a 30-day ceasefire as a prelude to elaborate peace talks. Ukraine agreed to the ceasefire, while Putin’s answer was a vague yes, but he wants Ukraine to abandon its NATO aspirations and cede territory. The Russian proposal was deemed “promising but incomplete” by Trump after his representative Steve Witkoff met Putin. Witkoff had to wait for eight hours before he got a chance to speak to Putin. Direct Trump-Putin talks are expected soon.

Notably, Trump has not lifted sanctions on Russia, and additional punitive measures are planned against its shadow 280-tanker fleet. The US treasury department’s General Licence 8L, issued by the Biden administration to 12 Russian financial institutions, expired on March 12. This exemption allowed limited hard currency operations in the energy sector, but Trump’s refusal to renew it is seen as pressure on Russia to accept the ceasefire. A two-hour telephone conversation between Trump and Putin on March 18 gave little result except the exchange of 175 prisoners of war from each side. No sooner than they spoke on banning strikes on energy infrastructure and general rhetoric of peace, Russian drones rained on Ukraine for several hours, targeting a hospital in Sumy, killing civilians and destroying houses in Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia and Odesa.

What lies ahead?

Pragmatists in Russia believe that a ceasefire offers a chance to mend ties with the west and get rid of the sanctions. They understand the necessity of withdrawing from Ukrainian territories as well. Their stance on reparations or war crimes accountability, however, remains unclear. What is clear is that Russia cannot be the same after the war. To save face and to get what it needs from the international community, it needs a regime change. The name of First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov, an economist, is floated as a possible future leader who might reshape Russia after the war. Trump’s accommodating steps seem promising to these circles, yet Putin’s imperialist faction, bolstered by propaganda, still dominates, leaving many in Europe doubtful whether Russia will honour a ceasefire.

Unlike Russia, people in Ukraine debate the war openly―on the frontlines, on social media, in its streets and public spaces. Most prioritise saving lives and securing guarantees. In shaping a future peace deal, surrendering vast swathes of territory is unthinkable. A bitter aftertaste lingers: historically, the US has supported Russia at Ukraine’s expense―recognising the USSR in 1932 amid the Holodomor (Ukrainian famine) that ravaged Ukraine’s farmlands, forcing Ukraine to abandon its nuclear arsenal under the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 and then failing its obligations when Russia took Crimea in 2014. Young Ukrainians harbour deep scepticism. The same is true for its European partners.

In their support for Ukraine, European leaders announced that 30 countries, including China, will join the ‘coalition of the willing’ in sending peacekeepers to Ukraine, after a peace treaty has been concluded. China’s shift towards Europe to balance Russia-US tandem on Ukraine is significant.

It remains to be seen whether Ukraine’s partners will be reliable peace brokers, truly safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity rather than merely paying lip service. Should they fail, nuclear proliferation, aggressive territorial expansion and grave violation of human rights could become normalised globally. Shall we leave such a grim world to our future generations?

The author, formerly with the UN, is associate professor of international relations at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy.

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